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Abstract: The popularity of smartphones is leading to an ever growing number of mobile apps that are
published in official app stores. However, users might experience bugs and crashes for some of these apps.
In this paper, we perform an empirical study of the official Google Play Store to automatically mine for such
error-suspicious apps. We use the knowledge inferred from this analysis to build a recommender system of
buggy app checkers. More specifically, we analyze the permissions and the user reviews of 46, 644 apps
to identify potential correlations between error-sensitive permissions and error-related reviews along time.
This study reveals error-sensitive permissions and patterns that potentially induce the errors reported online
by users. As a result, our systems give app store moderators efficient static checkers to identify buggy apps
before they harm the reputation of the app store as a whole.
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Un Système de Recommandation de Vérificateurs d’Applications
Boguées pour les Modérateurs de Magasins d’Applications
Résumé : La popularité des smartphones engendre un nombre croissant d’applications mobiles qui
sont publiés dans des magasins officiels d’applications. Cependant, les utilisateurs peuvent rencontrer
des bogues et incidents avec certaines de ces applications. Dans cet article, nous effectuons une étude
empirique du magasin officiel Google Play Store pour extraire automatiquement ces applications sus-
pectes. Nous utilisons ensuite la connaissance construite au cours de cette analyse pour proposer un
système de recommandation de vérificateurs d’applications boguées. Plus précisément, nous analysons
les permissions et les commentaires des utilisateurs de 46, 644 applications pour identifier des corréla-
tions potentielles entre des permissions identifiées comme sensibles et les commentaires liés à des erreurs
au cours du temps. Cette étude révèle des permissions particulièrement sensibles aux erreurs ainsi que
des associations qui sont potentiellement la source des erreurs signalées par les utilisateurs en ligne. En
conséquence, notre système de recommandation offre aux modérateurs de magasins d’applications une
gamme de vérificateurs statiques pour identifier efficacement les applications boguées avant qu’elles ne
nuisent à la réputation du magasin dans son ensemble.
Mots-clés : Permissions Android, Bogues d’Applications Android, Vérificateurs d’Applications, Com-
mentaires des Utilisateurs
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Abstract—The popularity of smartphones is leading to an ever
growing number of mobile apps that are published in official
app stores. However, users might experience bugs and crashes
for some of these apps. In this paper, we perform an empirical
study of the official Google Play Store to automatically mine
for such error-suspicious apps. We use the knowledge inferred
from this analysis to build a recommender system of buggy app
checkers. More specifically, we analyze the permissions and the
user reviews of 46, 644 apps to identify potential correlations
between error-sensitive permissions and error-related reviews
along time. This study reveals error-sensitive permissions and
patterns that potentially induce the errors reported online by
users. As a result, our systems give app store moderators efficient
static checkers to identify buggy apps before they harm the
reputation of the app store as a whole.
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of smartphones is leading to a rapidly
growing number of mobile apps, which are distributed through
dedicated stores. According to a recent study, 70% of mobile
application developers targeted the Android platform in Q3
2014 [31], and the Google Play Store1 currently offers over
1, 300, 000+ apps [3] for download.
However, there are many different app stores, depending
on the platform, the country, and the business model. The role
of an app store moderator is a complex one as s/he stands
between app developers and end-users. On the one hand, end-
users want high-quality apps, on the other hand, app developers
want open platforms to express their creativity. Thus, app store
moderators constantly make business and technical trade-offs
to keep both users and developers happy and stay competitive
in the ever-changing mobile computing landscape.
Any smartphone user knows that the quality of mobile apps
greatly varies. For instance, we discovered a large number of
exceptions raised in the wild on Android apps [18]. As Google
Play Store lacks of source inspection before publishing apps,
low-quality and malicious apps (e.g., malware) easily reach
the store. Recently, CHABADA [16] and WHYPER [25] intro-
duced novel approaches for identifying malware Android apps,
which misbehave with regard to their description. However,
these approaches do not cover another challenging threat for
app stores: buggy apps, which disrupt user experience and
inevitably store quality.
An app checker is a mechanism to determine whether an
app is potentially error-prone when the developer uploads it.
If an app store use app efficient checkers, the overall quality
of apps would raise. An app checker can be either dynamic or
static, and in this paper, we focus on the latter. As all checkers
1https://play.google.com/store
(whether on mobile, desktop or server applications), app store
checkers may suffer from false positives. In our case, it means
that an app would be flagged as being potentially buggy while
it is actually working fine. If an app store moderator enables
checkers with too many false positives, it would be a deal-
breaker for app developers. On the other end, if s/he disables
all checkers, s/he risks hosting buggy apps, which would
degrade the app store reputation.
To solve this problem, this paper proposes a recommender
system of mobile app checkers for application moderators.
This system enables app store moderators to make informed
decisions on which checkers to enable based on quantitative
measurements of their capabilities. Beyond existing researches
on the use of permissions by Android apps [5], [13], [14], [28],
we investigate the correlation between permission requests and
errors reported by end-users. In particular, we perform an em-
pirical study of the official Google Play Store to automatically
mine permissions that correlate with bugs. From this study, we
devise a taxonomy of permissions and a family of app checkers
that can predict error-proneness upon submission of new apps.
To validate our approach, we identify a set of buggy apps
using a data-mining technique and we compute the accuracy of
each checker. From an analysis of the negative user reviews of
46, 644 apps, we build an oracle of error-proneness to measure
the quality of our app checkers. These checkers exhibit an
accuracy between 61.42% to 61.96%. Note that we identify
symptoms of bugginess and we do not intend to point out
the underlying causes of bugs. Our evaluation shows that app
store moderators can be provided with large scale quantitative
information regarding the relevance of enabling app checkers.
To sum up, the contributions of this paper are:
• We set up a family of permission-based checkers for
mobile apps and integrate them into a recommender
system for app store moderators;
• We propose a novel evaluation scenario based on au-
tomatically mining 1, 400, 000+ online user reviews to
identify a set of error-suspicious apps;
• We report on a taxonomy of permissions that Android
apps can request based on the study of 46, 644 apps
available on Google Play Store. Using a grounded the-
ory method the taxonomy classifies permissions under 4
categories and 5 specific classes;
• We conduct an extensive analysis of the relevance of the
recommender system of app checkers and the performance
of the considered permission based checkers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides an overview of the Android permission
model and a summary of our proposal. Section III describes the
dataset we built for performing the empirical study. Section IV
describes an approach for mining online user reviews and
discover apps with reviews discussing about errors. Section V
proposes a taxonomy of permission types for Android apps.
Section VI presents the recommender system of buggy app
checkers proposed. Section VII evaluates the approach. Sec-
tion VIII summarizes the related work. Finally, Section IX
concludes the paper and outlines future work.
II. OVERVIEW
In this section, we first provide a brief background on the
Android permission model, and we then present an overview
of our proposal.
A. Background on Android Permissions
Android apps run in a sandbox—i.e., an isolated area of
the system that does not have access to system resources
by default. Android provides a set of APIs to enable the
application to access to data, resources, and privileged op-
erations. The APIs are protected by a permission model:
Apps must explicitly request the required permissions to
access protected resources. Every app has a manifest file
(AndroidManifest.xml) that summarizes essential infor-
mation about the app. In particular, the manifest declares the
permissions that the app requires for its execution, and a
package name that serves as unique identifier for the app.
When an app attempts to access a resource protected by a
permission, the system checks the content of the manifest at
runtime.
App developers are solely responsible for identifying the
set of permissions required by their apps. Sometimes, develop-
ers fail assigning the adequate permissions, often because the
available documentation of the Android permission system is
incomplete [4], [13], [30]. However, a permission error often
results in an exception (e.g., SecurityException) being
thrown back to the app during execution [2], often leading to
the app crash.
As a matter of clarification, we distinguish between two
terms that are used along the paper: Permission requests
refer to permissions declared by apps in their manifest file
; permission types group available permissions that any app
can request.
B. Overview of the Proposal
Our proposed approach consists of five steps, illustrated in
Figure 1 together with the techniques and tools used: (1) We
start by collecting Android app metadata from Google Play
Store (Section III). (2) Then, for each app, we retrieve online
reviews made by users in Google Play Store (Section IV-A).
(3) Using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) on the reviews,
we isolate the reviews discussing about errors, and we identify
a set of error-suspicious apps (Section IV-C). (4) The fourth
step consists in analyzing the existing permissions declared
by apps and proposing a taxonomy of these permissions
(Section V). (5) Taking as input the permission classification
performed in step 4 and the error-suspicious apps in step 3,
we automatically mine buggy-permission patterns using a data
mining algorithm and propose a family of buggy app checkers
that constitutes the basis of a recommender system for assisting
app store moderators (Section VI).
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Fig. 1. Overview of our approach to identify efficient buggy app checkers.
III. THE APP ANALYTICS FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe the dataset we build to perform
our empirical study and some key statistics about this dataset.
A. Dataset Collection
We build a dataset that consists of a random sample of
all the mobile apps available on the Google Play Store. The
apps belong to the 27 different categories2 defined by Google,
and the 4 predefined subcategories (free, paid, new free, and
new paid). For each category-subcategory pair (tools-free,
tools-paid, sports-new free, etc.), we collect a maximum
of 500 samples3. In addition, for each app, we retrieve the
following metadata: name, package, creator, version code,
version name, number of downloads, size, upload date, star
rating, star counting, and the set of permission requests.
Since the Google Play Store is continuously evolving
(adding, removing and/or updating apps), we updated the
dataset twice. We started by collecting available apps in
November 2013 (D0). Then, we updated the dataset in January
2014 (D1) and March 2014 (D2). In the rest of this paper,
we use D1 for performing the empirical study and D2 for
assessing the approach.
B. Statistics on the Collected Apps
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of our dataset along time
in terms of additions, removals and updates of apps and
permission types. D1 contains 38, 781 apps requesting 7, 826
different permissions, while D2 contains 46, 644 apps and
9, 319 different permission requests. The observed evolution
tends to add new apps, more than updating or removing
existing ones. In January, 15, 023 new apps appeared, 9, 001
apps (33, 13%) were updated, and 3, 411 apps (12, 55%) were
removed. Similarly in March, 12, 543 new apps appeared,
8, 970 apps (23, 13%) were updated and 4, 680 apps (12, 07%)
disappeared.
We observe that the app updates tend to rather add
permissions than remove existing ones. Out of the 3, 411
apps that updated to a new version in January 2014, there
are 2, 677 apps (78.48%) that update their set of permis-
sion requests. Specifically, there are 3, 007 permission re-
quest removals and 5, 225 permission request additions. This
2Books&Reference, Business, Comics, Communication, Education, En-
tertainment, Finance, Games, Health&Fitness, Libraries&Demo, Lifestyle,
Live Wallpaper, Media&Video, Medical, Music&Audio, News&Magazines,
Personalization, Photography, Productivity, Shopping, Social, Sports, Tools,
Transportation, Travel&Local, Weather, Widgets.
3This number is a constraint enforced by the Google Play Store.
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Fig. 2. Evolution of apps and permissions in Google Play Store.
confirms that the trend of adding more and more permis-
sions pointed out by previous studies [32] still holds. We
have also observed that some apps are adding unneces-
sary permission requests when updating to a new version.
For example, there are 74 apps adding the deprecated per-
mission [appPackage].permission.MAPS_RECEIVE
previously required to use the Google Maps API v1. The
update of Google Play Services 3.1.59 (in July 2013) made this
permission useless4. Furthermore, apps request 6 permissions
by median, and at maximum, request 83 different permissions.
Figure 3 reports on the number of apps requesting different
number of permissions. For example, there are 180 apps
requesting more than 35 different permissions. In contrast,
there are 2, 592 apps that do not request any permission.
16-20 perm (1,546apps)
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26-30 perm (235 apps)
31-35 perm (114 apps)
1-5 perm
6-10 perm
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Fig. 3. Distribution of apps per number of permission requests.
Figure 4 compares our dataset with the datasets used in
the related work in order to evaluate its representativity. The
left Y axes reports in logarithmic scale the number of different
apps considered. Our dataset is the second largest among the
datasets reported in the literature on this topic. The right Y
axes focuses on the number of different permissions. Our
dataset contains the largest number of permissions: 1, 874 dif-
ferent permissions. While related work only focus on Android
permissions (≈140 permissions), we consider other types of
permissions available for Android apps, e.g. Google-specific
permissions (cf. Section V for details). In conclusion, we
believe the dataset is representative for performing the study.
4Google Maps Android API v2 Release Notes: https://developers.google.
com/maps/documentation/android/releases?hl=en#july 2013
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C. Representing Apps Ecosystem as a Graph
To store the dataset, we created a graph database with
Neo4J5. This dataset therefore consists of a graph describing
the apps as nodes and edges. Graph databases provide a
powerful and scalable data modelling and querying technique
capable of representing any kind of data in a highly accessible
way [27]. We chose a graph database because the graph
visualization helps to identify connections among data (e.g.,
clusters of apps sharing similar sets of permission requests).
Our dataset graph contains five types of nodes: APP nodes
grouping the details of each app, PERMISSION nodes de-
scribing permission types, CATEGORY nodes describing app
categories, SUBCATEGORY nodes describing app subcate-
gories, and REVIEW nodes storing user reviews. Furthermore,
there are four types of relationships between APP nodes and
each of the remaining nodes. In total, our graph contains
1, 449, 361 nodes and 1, 901, 703 relationships among them.
To detail statistics about the dataset, we can query the graph
database using one of the available graph query languages (e.g.,
Cypher, SPARQL, Gremlin). We chose Cypher [11], which is
a widely used pattern matching language. This graph database
is available for download6.
IV. MINING ERROR-SUSPICIOUS APPS
We are interested in revealing potential correlations be-
tween the usage of error-sensitive permissions and the emer-
gence of bugs, thus we first have to mine buggy apps. To
automatically distinguish buggy apps that tend to crash during
execution, we analyze the online reviews written by users in
Google Play Store. This gives us an oracle of error-proneness.
However, it is inconceivable to manually analyze millions of
reviews available in the Google Play Store. Consequently, we
use unsupervised machine learning (specifically topic mining)
to automatically identify clusters of error-related topics.
A. User Review Mining
For each app, we collected the reviews posted by users in
the Google Play Store. For each review, we extracted the title,
description, associated device, and version of the app. None
of these fields are mandatory, thus several reviews lack some
of these details. As app updates might fix bugs from previous
releases, some errors reported in the version 1.1 of a given
5http://www.neo4j.org
6https://sites.google.com/site/androidbuggyappcheckers
app may be fixed in the new release 1.2. Therefore, from all
the reviews attached to an app, we only consider the reviews
associated with the latest version of the app. We collected up
to a maximum of the latest 500 reviews per app, resulting in
a corpus of 1, 402, 717 reviews. Each app has 36 reviews on
average associated with the latest version of the app.
B. Topic Mining
To identify online reviews that treat topics related to bugs
and errors, we extract topics discussed in these reviews using
a topic modelling technique. Specifically, we apply the Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [7] algorithm. LDA identifies top-
ics discussed in an entire corpus of documents and is able to
analyze a large volume of unlabelled text. For each document,
LDA estimates a probability distribution over the mined topics.
For example, one document may have a probability of 0.7 to
relate to topic #2 and of 0.3 to belong to topic #1 (the sum is
always 1). In this case, the document mostly belongs to topic
#2. The LDA model takes as an input parameter the number
of topics to extract. The rational of using topic models is to
automatically (1) cluster reviews discussing about errors, and
(2) extract keywords that characterize error themes without
sketching them beforehand. We are particularly interested in
topic models that reveal bug-related keywords, which were
unforeseen initially.
To implement this approach, we use MALLET (MAchine
Learning for LanguagE Toolkit) [23], a Java library that
provides an implementation of LDA. We consider each single
review of apps as a document, thus leading to 1, 402, 717
documents. To reduce noise in the modeled topics, we filter
out English stop words7 from the entire corpus. In order to
achieve a better precision, in a preliminary exploratory phase,
we ran the LDA algorithm using different number of topics.
The best results are obtained for 100 topics, this is the value
used in the experiments presented below.
C. Identifying Error-suspicious Apps
Our approach to identify error-suspicious apps comprises
the following steps:
1) Extract topics. Using LDA, we mine the topics discussed
in the app reviews. With our default parameter, we obtain
100 topics.
2) Select relevant topics. From the mined topics, we
manually select the topics that are related to bugs and
crashes. From our dataset, we automatically identify the
following 3 relevant topics:
#24: fix update problem fixed bug issue crashes phone
stars bugs plz pls time crashing problems working
issues crash hope
#48: work doesn doesnt won didn working open
kit show load kat properly anymore sucks bad note
worked android wont
#81: app crashes force time open fix close closes
won crashing work crash start freezes working times
constantly closing doesn
3) Select error-related reviews. To select error-related re-
views, we analyze the probability distribution given by
7We used the list of 524 common English stop words included in Mallet.
LDA for each review. Since a review can discuss several
topics, we consider as error-related reviews those with at
least 5% of its probability related to a topic discussing
buggy behaviour. Examples of error-related reviews ob-
tained8:
Astoundingly buggy. Get ready for the app to crash
when you want it to work, and for it to linger in your
notification bar even after you force close. I have
no idea how such a phenomenal show has such a
disappointing app.
Crashes all the time. I love TAL but this app is
horrible. Actually it is a good app but it literally
crashes every time I put it to use. Sometimes it will
open up and I can start a show and listen to the whole
thing and when it is done it crashes. Sometimes it
crashes as it is opening.
4) Select error-suspicious apps. We consider as error-
suspicious apps, the set of apps containing at least n
error-related review. The minimum number of error-
related reviews is a parameter to be decided by app store
moderators depending on the quality they want to ensure
in their stores, and the confidence they have on the users
reporting reviews. In this work, we have considered the
minimum possible evidence of problems (n > 1 review).
To sum up, by applying unsupervised machine learning on
the reviews of apps, we automatically learn a class label for
each app: “Buggy” or “NonBuggy”.
D. Empirical Results
Our process enables the identification of 10, 658 error-
suspicious apps (27.48%) in our dataset. Figure 5 shows the
number of error-suspicious apps identified in each category of
the Google Play Store. For each category, we illustrate the
distribution of error-suspicious apps according to the number
of error-related reviews published by users. With 68.90%
of apps having error-related reviews, the category GAME
contains the largest number of error-suspicious apps. These
data are in line with the results of the study performed by
Crittercism based on observations in real devices, showing that
gaming apps have the highest crash rate [10].
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8The reviews belong to the app: “This American Life” (version 2.1.8),
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.prx.talbot. The dates of the
reviews are 13-12-2013 and 18-12-2013, respectively.
V. ANALYSING APP PERMISSIONS
Now that we have identified error-suspicious apps, the
next step is to analyze app permissions, in order to find
correlations between permission and error-proneness. We start
by proposing a taxonomy to classify the types of permissions
that Android apps can request. This classification will later
support the identification of error-sensitive permissions to
propose a family of app permission checkers. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to provide such a kind of
taxonomy.
A. Taxonomy Creation
To create the taxonomy, we follow a grounded theory
approach [29]. We first review the literature and define a draft
taxonomy based on observations made by prior works [5],
[13]. As a matter of example, Felt et al. [13] state that they
consider neither developer-defined permissions nor Google-
defined ones in their analysis. In addition, they reveal the
existence of a set of non-official Android APIs. We include
those types of permissions as categories in the taxonomy and
we investigate them in depth. Another example is Barrera et
al. [5], who manually observed that some apps in their dataset
request non-existent permissions and deprecated permissions.
We also consider information provided in the official Android
documentation for developers9 and in Android community
forums (e.g., Android Developers Blog10).
B. Permission Types Taxonomy
The taxonomy classifies permissions into four main cate-
gories:
1) Android-specific permissions refers to permission types to
use the official APIs provided by the Android SDK11. For
example, android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
allows an app to read the user’s contacts data.
2) Google-specific permissions groups the permission types
to use the APIs provided by the Google Play Services
SDK12, which include services such as: Google Play
Licensing, Google Play In-app Billing, Google Maps,
Google Cloud Messaging (GCM), etc. For example, the
permission com.android.vending.BILLING is re-
quired to use the In-app Billing service that enables to
sell products from inside an app.
3) Vendor-specific permissions encloses permission types
to use the APIs included in SDKs provided by specific
mobile device vendors (e.g., Samsung, HTC) to create
apps specialized for their devices. As an illustration,
Samsung provides the AllShare Framework SDK that
includes APIs13 to implement convergence services
(e.g., media sharing, screen sharing). Apps using
AllShare APIs should request the following permission:
com.sec.android.permission.PERSONAL_ME-
DIA14. Another example is the permission
9http://developer.android.com
10http://android-developers.blogspot.com
11http://developer.android.com/sdk
12http://developer.android.com/google
13Samsung documentation for developers: http://developer.samsung.com/
develop
14“sec” comes from: Samsung Electronics Co
com.sonymobile.permission.CAMERA_ADDON
that is part of the Sony Add-on SDK15 (Camera Add-on
API) required to develop apps that can be launched from
the native Xperia camera.
4) Developer-specific permissions finally refers to permis-
sion types defined by third-party developers. Android
enables apps to define their own permissions to protect
the functionality they expose to other apps. For exam-
ple, android.webkit.permission.PLUGIN from
Adobe Flash plugin.
We group permissions within each category around 5
classes of permissions:
(a) Official permissions groups permissions that are available
in the public SDK’s documentations for developers.
(b) Removed permissions refers to permissions that were
available in previous versions of APIs and do not exist
anymore.
(c) Internal permissions encloses permissions that are in-
tended for internal use by the system and system apps.
(d) Incorrect permissions groups permissions defined erro-
neously by developers (e.g., misspelled permissions).
(e) Unclassified permissions groups permissions that do not
fit into any of the previous classes.
As we will show later, all the classes of permissions have been
identified in the four categories of permissions.
C. Taxonomy Exploitation
We extracted all the permissions collected in our graph
database and classify them according to the proposed taxon-
omy. We use heuristics, based on regular expression matching
and string analysis, to catalog permissions under categories:
Heuristic 1 (Android-specific permissions): First,
to identify permissions belonging to the Android-
specific category, we filter permissions which follow
the patterns: android.permission.[*] or
com.android.[*].permission.[*]. From these
permissions, we tag as official the permissions that match
the list provided in the public Android documentation for
developers according to Android 4.4 (API level 19)16.
Heuristic 2 (Google-specific permissions): To identify
permissions belonging to the Google-specific category,
we filter permissions which follow the patterns:
com.google.android.[*].permission.[*], or
com.android.[*]. The last pattern excludes the word
‘‘permission’’ as it matches the Android-specific
pattern. Examples of Google-specific permissions that follow
this pattern are com.android.vending.BILLING
and com.android.vending.CHECK_LICENSE to
use the billing and licensing services, respectively. From
these permissions, we define the class of internal Google
permissions with the permissions defined by Google
apps (e.g., Voice Search, GMail). These permissions
follow the patterns com.google.android.apps.[Go-
ogleAppName].[*] or com.google.android.google-
apps.permission.[*]. For example, com.goo-
15Sony documentation for developers: http://developer.sonymobile.com
16http://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission.html
gle.android.voicesearch.SHORTCUTS_ACCESS in
the Voice Search app.
Heuristic 3 (Vendor-specific permissions): To
identify permissions belonging to the Vendor-
specific category, we filter permissions following the
patterns com.[vendor].[*].permission.[*] or
android.permission.[vendor].[*]. We compile a
predefined list of available vendor names: sonymobile, htc,
huawei, sec (Samsung Electronics Co), dell, and motorola.
Heuristic 4 (Classes refinement): We build lists of per-
missions to refine the permissions contained in each category
under specific classes: official, removed, and internal. These
lists are manually created by collecting documentation avail-
able in different sources. As a matter of example, the Android
SDK contains a set of internal APIs that are intended for
exclusive use by the system and system apps. However, they
are available from the Android source code and third-party
apps can access internal APIs using Java reflection [13]. The
internal APIs reside in the Android source code in the package
com.android.internal, and in the other packages with
the annotation @hide.
Heuristic 5 (Identifying incorrect permissions): We select
all the permissions within a category that are considered as
unclassifiable in previous classes. To automatically identify
incorrect permissions, we compute the Damerau-Levenshtein
distance [12] to measure the similarity between two input
strings. We normalize the distance to the range [0, 1] by
dividing the distance by the length of the longest string, thus
defined as:
distNDL(s1, s2) =
distDL(s1, s2)
max(|s1|, |s2|) (1)
We compute the normalized Damerau-Levenshtein distance
between each unclassified permission P and each official
permission Oi. Finally, we set the similarity score of an
unclassified permission as the minimum distance of all the
obtained normalized Damerau-Levenshtein distances:
score(P ) = min{distNDL(P,Oi)}, i = {0...n} (2)
Considering different similarity ranges, we observed 5
types of permission request mistakes in the Google Play Store:
Misspell. For example, requesting
android.permission.READ_CONCACTS instead of
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS.
Wrong prefix. Each permission is identified by a unique
label. Typically, the label is defined by a string starting
with a prefix (e.g. android.permission.) followed
by a constant in capital letters. We have identified a set
of permissions defining incorrect prefixes, specifically two
common mistakes:
Prefix absence. For example, INTERNET is missing the
prefix android.permission. The rational for this mistake
seems to come from the official Android documentation on
permissions, which first provides a table with the permissions
showing only the constant part.
Prefix confusion. For example, requests to
android.permission.SET_ALARM, instead of
com.android.alarm.permission.SET_ALARM.
Misuse. It is a special case of prefix misuse. Apps re-
quest as permissions other Android elements (e.g., libraries,
features). For example: android.hardware.CAMERA.
Lacking. Finally, we also observed some permissions that
look like being incomplete: android.permission.
In addition to these mistakes, we build a cluster of unclas-
sified permissions: all the permissions within a category that
do not fit in any of the defined classes. Finally, the developer-
specific permissions category covers permissions that do not
fit into any of the previous categories.
We manually validated the resulting permission classifica-
tion. We took a random sample of 300 permissions. Our man-
ual inspection found 5.33% of false positives. Some false pos-
itives derive from the interpretation of permissions. For exam-
ple, the permission android.permission.SEND_MMS17
was tagged as Misspelled Android permission while it
is obviously not. The nearest match is the permission
android.permission.SEND_SMS. However, we con-
sider the developer is trying to access to a functionality related
with MMS instead of SMS, and it is not a misspelling.
Table I synthesizes the results of measuring the abundance
of each class of the the permission taxonomy to our dataset.
For each category and class of the taxonomy we show the
number of permissions and permission requests. We observed
that official Android-specific permissions are the most com-
monly requested ones among apps. Removed permissions is
the second most popular class among the dataset.
We consider as error-sensitive permissions the set of per-
missions belonging to the classes removed, internal, incorrect
and unclassified, since the use of non official and valid
permissions can be the source of problems. Now, we aim to
identify potential permission patterns that correlate with bugs.
D. Influence of Permissions on Error-related Reviews
First, we ask the following research question: To what
extent apps which have error-related reviews request error-
sensitive permissions? In our dataset, there are 10, 658 apps
having error-related reviews. Out of these 10, 658 apps, 1, 073
request error-sensitive permissions (10.07%).
Thus, we raise the second research question: Do apps that
request error-sensitive permissions have error-related reviews?
In our dataset, there are 4, 288 apps requesting error-sensitive
permissions, and from these, there are 2, 598 apps with at least
one review (not necessarily bad). Out of these 2, 598 apps,
1, 304 have error-related reviews. This means that 50.19% of
the apps requesting error-sensitive permissions can be consid-
ered as error-suspicious. This can be explained because some
permissions that we have identified as error-sensitive do not
really exhibit errors at runtime. For example, including some
deprecated permissions in the manifest does not necessarily
produce any side-effects. Furthermore, as pointed by prior
studies, many apps declare more permissions than they actually
use [13].
This confirms that: 1) app bugs may be related to permis-
sions and 2) there are many other reasons behind app bugs. In
the next section, we further explore the statistical relationship.
17This permission does not exist in the official Android documentation.
TABLE I. SUMMARY OF APPLYING THE PERMISSION TAXONOMY TO OUR GOOGLE PLAY STORE DATASET
Official Removed Internal Incorrect Unclassified
#Perm #Req #Perm #Req #Perm #Req #Perm #Req #Perm #Req
Android 137 245, 274 19 1, 699 50 1, 040 144 561 152 1, 240
Google 5 18, 246 837 1, 107 51 200 39 61 3 22
Vendor 184 1, 514 - - - - - - - -
Samsung 88 302 - - - - - - - -
Sony 38 291 - - - - - - - -
HTC 28 251 - - - - - - - -
Dell 14 14 - - - - - - - -
Motorola 12 649 - - - - - - - -
Huawei 4 7 - - - - - - - -
Developer 1, 085 2, 875 - - - - - - - -
TOTAL 1,411 267,909 856 2,806 101 1,240 183 622 155 1,262
To clarify, not all the bugs are related to the suspicious
permissions themselves (e.g., missing permission, wrong per-
mission due to a typo), but rather to the fact that some APIs for
which the permission is requested are buggy or obsolete [22].
We study the correlation between permission requests and
buginess without claiming the underlying causes of bugs.
VI. DESIGNING A RECOMMENDER SYSTEM OF BUGGY
APP CHECKERS
Based on our identification of error-suspicious apps (cf.
Section IV) and error-sensitive permissions (cf. Section V),
we now study the relationship between them in order to
identify potential correlations between apps that use error-
sensitive permissions and those reported as error-suspicious
by end-users. We use the knowledge inferred from this study
to propose buggy app checkers that could be embedded in app
stores, such as the Google Play, to anticipate the emergence
of app crashes in the wild.
A. Generating App Permission Checkers
Now, we ask the following research question: Are there
some common permission patterns in the presence of error-
suspicious apps? With the objective of mining common per-
missions in error-suspicious apps, we use supervised machine
learning, and specifically a classifier where independent vari-
ables are permissions and the dependent variable is error-
proneness.
1) Dataset Preprocessing: Let D be a dataset of apps,
we represent each app (A) as a binary vector: A =
[p1, ..., pn, c1, ..., cn, L], where pi ∈ {0, 1}, ci ∈ {0, 1}, and
L ∈ {Buggy,NonBuggy}. Each pi depicts a permission
available in our database, ci represents a class of permission
(according to our taxonomy), and L represents the class
label learnt from its reviews (cf. Section IV-C). The value
pi=1 indicates that the app requests the permission pi, and
pi=0 indicates the absence of the permission. Similarly, ci=1
indicates that the app requests a permission that belongs to the
class ci (e.g., INCORRECT class) in our taxonomy.
For the purpose of this analysis, we group all the classes
of infrequent single permissions (e.g., the misspelled ones)
within a common abstract class. Indeed, a specific mis-
spelled permission usually only appears in one app, but we
are rather interested in knowing if the group of incorrect
permissions is frequent in error-suspicious apps. There are
also some permission names that are customized in each
app. For example, apps requesting the GCM Google service
must include a specific permission for receiving messages:
[appPackage].permission.C2D_MESSAGE. The per-
mission name must exactly match the pattern, but each app
substitutes [appPackage] by its own package name in the
manifest. This permission prevents other apps from registering
and receiving their messages. Therefore, each specific GCM
permission is only requested once at maximum. Moreover,
we grouped all the official Android permissions in a single
dimension18. We notice that the 10 most requested official
Android permissions in our dataset are the same top requested
permissions observed by other studies [1], [14]19.
Finally, the 4 classes of permissions considered are:
ANDROID, INCORRECT, GCM, and REMOVED-GOOGLE
permissions. Each app is represented by a 1,563-dimensions
vector, where the first 1, 558 dimensions represent single
permissions (pi), the following 4 dimensions refer to classes of
permissions (ci), and the last dimension is the assigned class
label (L).
2) Mining Error-suspicious Permission Patterns: To iden-
tify permission patterns that correlate with bugs, we use
J48 Decision Tree algorithm (a Weka20 implementation of
C4.5 [26]), which is a predictive machine-learning model. J48
predicts the value of a dependent variable based on the value
of various attributes (independent variables) of the data. In
our setup, the independent variables are permissions, and the
dependent variable is bugginess. From the resulting decision
tree model, we extract permission patterns that lead to the
label ‘Buggy’. We only consider presence of permissions in the
patterns. However the absence of a permission also causes the
app to crash. This kind of bug is partially handled by our ap-
proach, when the permission is missing because of an incorrect
or incomplete declared permission. Furthermore, there already
exists some developer support [6] to automatically check if
apps declare all the permissions required to run.
18The request of Android permissions should not make the app crash, and
we are rather interested in revealing the existence of patterns in error-sensitive
permissions. First, we run the experiment considering all the official Android
single permissions, but the most requested permissions appeared in many
checkers, leading to high amount of irrelevant patterns.
19The most requested permissions in our dataset are: INTERNET,
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE, READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE,
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, READ_PHONE_STATE,
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE, WAKE_LOCK, ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION,
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, and VIBRATE
20Weka is an open-source Java library that provides implementations of
several data mining algorithms: http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka
The algorithm takes as input parameters a confidence
factor and a minimum number of objects (minNumObj). The
confidencefactor limits the prediction error. For example,
a confidence factor of 0.25 indicates that a permission pat-
tern fails as maximum in the 25% of predictions. Thus, the
lower the confidence factor, the more accurate the classifier.
The minNumObj parameter sets the minimum number of
instances that reach a leaf of the tree model. In our case it
represents the minimum number of apps that must exhibit a
permission pattern to be considered as a predictor of bugginess.
We train a J48 decision tree model using the dataset D1 that
contains 10, 658 apps labelled as Buggy and 11, 539 labelled
as NonBuggy. Varying the confidence and minNumObj
thresholds impacts the number of permission checkers obtained
and their respective performance. We run the algorithm several
times for different input values in order to identify the best
calibration. We set cross-validation 10 folds. Then, we train the
model with different confidence factors (ranging from 0.05 to
0.50 by increments of 0.05) with three different minNumObj
limits—i.e., 100, 50 and 20 apps. Figure 6 reports on the results
of the sensitivity analysis performed. The resulting family of
checkers ranges from 4 to 12 different permission checkers.
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Fig. 6. Calibration of confidence factor and minNumObj parameters.
The family of permission checkers obtained form the
knowledge of the recommender system. Using buggy app
checkers, app store moderators can make informed decisions
on which checkers to enable in order to identify potential
buggy-apps before they are published in the store. Table II
details 4 families of permission checkers obtained varying the
confidence factor and minNumObj values. For example, the
family F2 includes the 4 permissions pointed by F1 and one
additional permission. In the family F1, we observe two of-
ficial Google permissions: CHECK_LICENSE and BILLING.
Contrary to our expectations, these official Google permissions
are involved in some bugs. After searching in online forums for
Android developers, we realize that there are many Android
developers complaining because they have experienced crashes
(due to security exceptions) in their apps after the update of
Google Play services 4.3 (March 2014).
Note that the buggy permission checkers presented in this
paper are not meant to be permanent. The app ecosystem
is continuously evolving, and app store moderators can use
our approach regularly (say monthly) for updating existing
checkers, discovering new ones, and discarding outdated ones.
The proposed system reveals interesting insights for iso-
lating bugs in real devices. Nevertheless, we do not claim
causality, but rather we suggest permissions that correlate with
bugs.
VII. EVALUATION
To assess the effectiveness of our approach, we investigate
three main research questions:
RQ1: What is the accuracy of the inferred checkers?
RQ2: To what extent checkers are able to flag new apps as
buggy?
RQ3: What is the effect of removing error-sensitive
permissions on error reviews?
A. Evaluating the Accuracy of App Checkers
Checkers often have false positives, which in our case
means that the app is flagged as buggy while still works fine.
To sum up, if the moderator enables checkers with too many
false positives, it can often flag apps as having bugs while
they are working fine, then disturbing app developers. On the
other end, if s/he disables all checkers, s/he risks hosting buggy
applications, which disrupt app user experience and degrade
the store reputation. For answering RQ1, we therefore evaluate
the accuracy of each checker. To evaluate the accuracy of the
proposed app checkers, we use the Laplace expected error
estimate [9] which is computed as follows:
LaplaceAccuracy = (nc + 1)/(ntot + k) (3)
where k is the number of classes in the domain, e.g.
Buggy/NonBuggy. ntot is the total number of examples covered
by the checker. In our case, is the total number of apps
requesting the permissions captured by the checker. nc is the
number of examples in the predicted class by the checker.
In our case, is the number of Buggy apps that request the
permissions captured by the checker.
We set cross-validation 10-folds and we perform a sen-
sitivity analysis of the accuracy of the checkers for different
values of input parameters. Figure 7 shows the accuracy of the
recommender system. The family of checkers exhibits an accu-
racy that ranges from 61.42% to 61.96%. We observe that the
reported accuracy does not change significantly for different
values of the parameters. Table II shows the accuracy (acc.)
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Fig. 7. Evaluation of the accuracy of the recommender system.
TABLE II. EVALUATION: APP PERMISSION CHECKERS AND THEIR ACCURACY.
C M Error-sensitive Permission Checker #B #NB %Acc
F1 0.1 100
android.permission.WRITE_INTERNAL_STORAGE
2, 888 1, 789 61.74android.permission.ACCESS_SUPERUSER
com.android.vending.CHECK_LICENSE
com.android.vending.BILLING
F2 0.2 100 F1 com.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS 2, 932 1, 824 61.64
F3 0.2 50 F1 android.permission.WRITE_OWNER_DATA 2, 928 1, 834 61.48
com.sonyericsson.extras.liveware.aef.EXTENSION_PERMISSION
F4 0.2 20 F3
com.google.android.googleapps.permission.GOOGLE_AUTH
2,986 1,841 61.86
android.permission.STORAGE
com.android.email.permission.READ_ATTACHMENT
com.google.android.gm.permission.READ_CONTENT_PROVIDER
values for some of the permission checkers identified. We also
report the total number of Buggy (#B) and NonBuggy (#NB)
apps which request the error-sensitive permissions captured by
the checkers.
B. Evaluating Checkers with New Apps
For answering RQ2, we use the dataset D2 updated in
March 2014 (cf. Section III-B). We select the subset of new
apps that appeared in D2 and did not exist in D1. D2 contains
6, 783 new apps (with reviews). We use the user reviews as our
ground-truth for determining if an app is buggy or not21. Thus,
we check if the D2-version apps flagged as suspicious by our
checkers have been reported as buggy by end users (after the
publication of the version of D2). Our system flagged 1, 896
apps as error-suspicious. Out of 1, 896 suspicious apps, 56%
of apps were also reported as buggy by end users.
The 56% of new apps flagged as suspicious by our
checkers were also reported as buggy by end users a
posteriori.
C. Impact of Removing Error-sensitive Permissions
To answer RQ3, we investigate if the apps that remove
error-sensitive permissions (captured by the checkers) in the
update get less error-related reviews. We noticed 30 apps (with
error-related reviews) that remove error-sensitive permissions
after updating. For these apps, we compute the percentage rate
of error-related reviews before and after the update. Figure 8
illustrates the evolution of the reviews in these apps. We
observe that after removing error-sensitive permissions, 22
apps (out of 30) remove error-related reviews. If the checkers
had been enabled in the app store, all those apps would have
been flagged as suspicious, thus avoiding buggy apps reaching
end-users.
D. Discussion and Threats
We focus on permission requests and user reviews to
build a family of buggy app checkers that can help app store
moderators to score the quality of a submitted app. One threat
to the internal validity of our study is that we have not analyzed
the source or binary code of apps to ensure that the declared
permissions are actually used.
21We are working on deploying experiments in real devices in the wild to
complement the quantitative study performed in this paper
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Fig. 8. Reviews evolution after removing error-sensitive permissions.
We consider user reviews as a ground truth of bugginess,
but we are aware that this measure is only an approximation.
Users do not always report crashes when faced, and some
bugs can be reported later in time. In addition, apps can crash
for many reasons, not only due to permission-related issues.
Currently, we are working on experiments in real devices to
address this threat.
The conceptual foundations of our approach are indepen-
dent of Android. We only need an oracle of bugginess and
some observation features (in our case, the user reviews and
the requested permissions, respectively). To gain in confidence
in the external validity of our evaluation, more evaluations are
needed on other platforms, using other oracles of bugginess
and features.
Let us now discuss the sensitivity of our approach. The
proposed approach is based on predefined thresholds specified
by various parameters. Table III summarizes these parameters
together with the reasonable values used in the experiments
reported in this paper. The calibration of these parameters can
impact the results and constitute a potential threat to validity.
We have performed a sensitivity analysis for different values
of these parameters. The reported accuracy does not change
significantly for different values.
VIII. RELATED WORK
We divide related work into two major groups, and survey
the literature in each group.
Android Permission analysis. Frank et al. [14] propose a
probabilistic model to identify permission patterns in Android
TABLE III. SUMMARY OF THE APPROACH’S PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
LDA model number of topics threshold (IV-B) 100
Error-related reviews threshold in suspicious apps (IV-C) > 1
Composition threshold in error-related reviews (IV-C) 0.05
J48 model confidence factor (VI-A2) 0.2
J48 model minNumObjects (VI-A2) 20
and Facebook apps. They found that permission patterns differ
between high-reputation and low-reputation apps. Barrera et
al. [5] studied the permission requests made by apps in the
different categories of the Google Play store by mapping apps
to categories based on their set of requested permissions. They
show that a small number of Android permissions are used
very frequently while the rest are only used occasionally.
In [20], Jeon et al. proposed a taxonomy that divides official
Android permissions into four groups based on the permission
behaviours (e.g., access to sensors, access to structured user
information). For each category, they propose new fine-grained
variants of the permissions. Chia et al. [8] performed a study
on Android permissions to identify privacy risks on apps. They
analyze the correlation between the number of permissions
requested by apps and several signals such as app popularity
and community rating. Our taxonomy has a different goal,
the aim of our classification is helping to identify error-
sensitive permissions. All previous studies only focus on of-
ficial Android-specific permissions, we also consider Google-
defined, Vendor-defined and Developer-defined permissions in
our analysis.
Xu in his thesis [21] presents a systematic study of apps
from Google Play Store. With reference to permissions, the
study observed developer-related errors. However, Xu does not
propose a technique for setting up buggy app checkers.
Our approach is also related to approaches that fo-
cus on identifying malicious behaviour in Android apps.
CHABADA [16] proposes an API-based approach to de-
tect apps which misbehave regarding their descriptions.
CHABADA clusters apps with similar descriptions and identi-
fies API usage outliers in each cluster. These outliers point out
potential malware apps. Similarly to our approach, CHABADA
uses topic modelling techniques. They apply LDA in the app
descriptions for grouping apps with similar themes. In contrast,
we use topic models on online user reviews (and not on app
descriptions) to automatically identify buggy apps (as opposed
to identify malware). Our aim is to identify permission patterns
that correlate with bugs.
On the static analysis side, there are several works focusing
on analyzing the source code and API calls in Android
apps to check if the declared permissions are actually used:
COPES [6], PScout [4], and Permlizer [33]. This is only
indirectly related to checkers for identifying buggy apps.
Online user review analysis. Several approaches have anal-
ysed online user reviews posted on the Google Play Store with
different purposes.
Ha et al. [17] manually analysed user reviews available on
Google Play Store to understand what users write about apps.
Performing this task manually becomes infeasible due to the
large amount of available reviews.
Chen et al. [24] present AR-Miner, a tool for mining
reviews from Google Play Store and extract user feedback.
They filter reviews that contain useful information for de-
velopers to improve their apps. As us, they use LDA to
group the reviews discussing about the same thematics. Fu et
al. [15] propose WisCom, a system to analyze user reviews
and ratings in order to identify the reasons why users like
or dislike apps. Iacob and Harrison [19] propose MARA, a
prototype for extracting feature requests from online reviews
of mobile applications. First, they identify the sentences of the
online reviews referencing to feature requests using a set of
predefined rules. Finally, they use LDA for identifying the most
common topics among the feature requests. As our approach,
all these approaches use LDA for identifying topics discussed
in the reviews. However, none of them use reviews as an oracle
of error-proneness. We focus on reviews to identify a set of
error-suspicious apps and to automatically learn a class label
for each app.
Linares-Va´squez et al. [22] demonstrate a correlation be-
tween the stability of APIs and the success of Android apps.
They also use user reviews for finding evidence of problems.
They manually analyze the reviews of apps which contain low
ratings. They look for reviews that contain some predefined
error-related keywords. Their aim is to assess that the identified
unsuccessful apps express the cause of the errors in their
reviews. On the contrary, we automatically analyze the reviews
of all apps, and identify error-related reviews using topic
models.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a recommender system that
detects potentially buggy apps by using the correlation between
permission patterns and error-proneness. We collected 46, 644
Android apps from Google Play Store with the aim of studying
the correlation between permission requests and the emergence
of errors and crashes. We started by mining 1, 400, 000+
online user reviews to identify error-related reviews that point
out error-suspicious apps. We used unsupervised machine
learning techniques to automatically identify error-suspicious
apps available in the Google Play Store. We then propose a
taxonomy of types of permissions requested by Android apps
that supports the analysis of permissions. With the knowledge
inferred from this analysis, we built permission-based checkers
that are then ranked by our the recommender system. The
permission-based checkers recommended by this system have
an accuracy between 61.42% to 61.96%.
Currently, we are working on developing experiments in
real devices in the wild with the set of error-suspicious apps
identified. We will use the insights obtained in this study as
starting point for isolating errors.
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